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INTRODUCTION

Owners of innovative chemical technologies have an unusual
love-hate relationship with the State of New Jersey. That state
has given root to most of the important chemical technological
discoveries of modem American industry, especially in the petrochemical, pharmaceutical and electrical fields.' Yet its residents' depth of fear of the adverse effects of chemicals has led to
a strong state disclosure law affecting chemicals, 2 with disclosure
* B.A., Boston College, 1969; J.D., University of Virginia, 1974. Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati; corporate practice, Cincinnati, Ohio. The
author appreciates the guidance of R.N. Berkwits of the NewJersey Bar. The views
expressed are solely those of the author.
I NewJersey was one of only six states to have chemicals as its "major industry
group ranked by value added by manufacture." U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1989, at 726-27 (1989). It is the major chemical
research and manufacturing state in the eastern United States.
2 New Jersey residents' concern about chemical releases is expressed in the
adoption of the statute discussed in this article, the Worker and Community Right
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consequences that have national implications.
This article will describe the pivotal role of New Jersey's disclosure law in challenging the trade secrecy protection that
chemical technology innovators enjoy. The information technology of the 1990's will permit individual residents to probe'neighborhood hazardous chemical concerns from personal computers,
accessing federal and state data bases. This article will explore
the consequences of the state's public disclosure programs on
world competition in chemical products. Cumulatively, the pressures of information access technology interacting with confidentiality concerns may shape the state's industrial future.
II.

TRADE SECRETS AND TECHNOLOGY

Trade secrets exist as pieces of information exclusive to one
owner that are not shared by the owner with competitors or the
public. Trade secrets give the owner a competitive advantage derived from the possession and ability to use that information
when competing with others who do not know, or cannot use that
piece of information.4 Many different interpretations of the
"trade secret" term exist. 5 Therefore, this article will not attempt to improve on a widely accepted Restatement definition.6
to Know Act, 1983 N.J. Laws 315, NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-1, -31 (West 1988). This
concern is elaborated on by a state environmental agency attorney. Chess, Clinical
Hazards at Work: Whose Business?, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 331, 345-46 (1985).
3 Federal and state chemical data bases are available under federal programs,
40 C.F.R. § 372 (1989), and their state counterparts. The NewJersey Department
of Health will place compact disk reader machines in each county for citizen use.
See U.S. EPA, Accessing the Toxics Release Inventory Data, vol. 10 Office of Toxic Substances Chemicals In Progress Bulletin at 3 (September 1989) and U.S. EPA Notice,
54 Fed. Reg. 24,415 (June 7, 1989). New Jersey also plans on-line data bases of
hazardous materials facility information. See New Jersey's RTK ProgramContinues Innovations, 3 Right-to-Know News 7 (Oct. 22, 1988).
4 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
5 See, e.g., Rohm and Haas Co. v. Adco Chemical Co., 689 F.2d 424 (3d Cir.
1982) (a trade secret may not be commonly known); Bolt Associates, Inc. v. Alpine
Geographical Associates, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 458 (D.NJ. 1965) (a trade secret may
be a formula, compilation, process or device which gives the owner a business advantage); see generally R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.01 (1990); W.
CASEY, J. MARTHINSEN AND L. Moss, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, PRODUCTIVITY AND THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (1983) [hereinafter W. CASEY]; Willis, An Economic
Evaluation of Trade Secrets, in PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS 1989, 737 (1989).

6 The Restatement definition includes "any formula.., or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939). This definition has been accepted, in New
Jersey as an appropriate standard. See Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 16 N.J. 252, 257,
108 A.2d 442, 445 (1954).
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The chemical development process generally produces three
types of technologies that can result in profitable trade secret innovations for use in products or in valuable licenses. The first
product of research is the most widely understood: the invention
of a new molecule which has beneficial properties and which, after the investment of time and money in patent processing, is the
most readily patentable. Next is the development of process
technology for improvement of the performance of mixtures and
basic raw materials so that, by complex handling of the molecules, an improved product may result. The last product is the
art of the specialist who mixes 'commonly available mateials to
produce a fragrance, lubricant or some specialized mixture that
gains market acceptance for its unusual synergistic properties.
Trade secrets are a creature of state law; they are not the
result of a constitutionally-derived federal monopoly as in the
patent system. 7 States establish statutes or case precedents
favoring the innovator in order to encourage further investments
within the state in the labor-intensive-and, therefore, employment-beneficial-function of research.' Some states create incentive funds, financing and other benefits to attract research
parks, technology centers and the like. At a minimum, states desiring research investments generally maintain a safety net of civil
and criminal protections to assure the innovator that any trade
secrets developed within that state will be protectable. 9
Generally, the concept of trade secrets is not understood by
the general public. This is so in spite of the fact that one is exposed to trade secrets daily in the process of cleaning house, adding gasoline to one's car or spending the ubiquitous dollar bill,
with its secret ink and paper formulas.' ° In general, a piece of
technology or a scientific discovery can be protected with either a
patent," or a trade secret. Only the owners know how many
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).'
8 New Jersey has both case precedents and statutory protection. See Sun Dial,
16 N.J. 252, 106 A.2d 442 (1954); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-1(i), -7, -9 (West 1982).
9 See generally J. POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS: A GUIDE TO PROTECTING PROPRIETARY
BUSINESS INFORMATION 49-88 (1989); Willis, supra note 5, at 752-53.
10 The concept of trade secrecy is open ended and can include formulations,
processes, and compilations of data. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939);
Sun Dial, 16 N.J. at 257, 108 A.2d at 445.
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1981). A patent is a federally
granted, limited monopoly with a fixed term of exclusivity and a lengthy, expensive
term of application. The presence of federal patent law does not eliminate the
need for state protection of proprietary data. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971, 979 (1989) (states free to protect use of trademarks and packaging to prevent consumer confusion as to source of goods);
7
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trade secrets exist, and there is no way of counting all of them,
even those that have been licensed for profit.
A.

New Jersey As the Pothole
Trade secret law is relatively common among all the states,
with defined events that terminate the secret status. Owners of
trade secrets can be compared to drivers accustomed to interstate highway travel. The highways are wide, safe, speedy and
have designated exits. The driver's choice to stay on or get off an
interstate highway is simple, and the majority of interstate highways offer relatively smooth driving with few dangerous
potholes. Similarly, the decision to license a trade secret in return for royalty payments can comfortably be negotiated in any
state with the relative assurance that trade secrets can be preserved on common legal principles throughout the United
States. 12
The most dangerous part of a freeway system is its end
point, where drivers must slow down, negotiate traffic circles or
sharp turns and wait for traffic lights. This is the site of many
accidents among people who cannot adjust to the sudden discomfort of complex decisions after the relative calm of the interstate. Prevention of fatal collisions is impossible. However, the
greater the signage, warnings and protective design features, the
greater the reduction a state can achieve in the accident rate at
these transition points.
Trade secret protections have posed little resistance as federal disclosure systems have expanded worker and community
access to information.1 3 New Jersey is the central focal point for
disclosure debates as the 1990's open: the pothole in the highway
of trade secret technology. Collisions between trade secrecy and
state mandates for public disclosure are likely to have adverse
effects on innovative technology in 1990 and thereafter. New
Jersey courts will weigh unusual and novel disclosure controversies, raising conflicts of health, deference to administrative expertise and due process. The New Jersey government faces some
very difficult policy decisions that will shape its future as a seedbed for chemical technology innovation in the 21st century.
Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 483 (patentability limited to express categories; trade
secret protection "encourages businesses to initiate new and individualized plans of
operation, and constructive competition results").
12 See generally Willis, supra note 5, at 757.
13 Relatively few trade secrecy disputes have arisen to date. See infra text accompanying notes 102-03.
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The Context of Trade Secrets

As mentioned in the introduction, trade secrets are a creature of state law. States accord such protection and can withdraw
it. As the United States Supreme Court observed in Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co.,14 legislation may remove the right of a trade secret owner to compensation for a "taking," by disclosure of that
secret. 15 To remove the right of compensation requires that the
owner be shown not to have had a "reasonable investment16
backed expectation" in the exclusive possession of its property.
In Ruckelshaus, a chemical formulator challenged the right of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to "take" its research
information for the benefit of other manufacturers, without the
typical contracts between companies which allocate royalties in
return for trade secret licenses. The EPA acted pursuant to authority contained in a federal statute. One condition of the statute was that data used in registration could be subject to later
nonconsensual use on behalf of competitors.' 7 Because the statute's potential for data disclosure was known to the registrants,
data submitted as part of the statutory scheme was thereafter not
subject to a "reasonable investment-backed expectation" that the
originator would have its traditional exclusive possession of the
trade secret under state law.'
Further, trade secrets outside of the regulated products category remain vitally important to the economy. Illustratively, the
United States trade balances include the value of technology licensing abroad: for example, the value paid by a Third World
nation for contractor refinery operations using American catalysts for the cracking of petrochemical fractions.19
C.

Patents are not a Complete Solution

Patents do not supplant trade secrets. The discovery of a
chemical or process must be safeguarded until the patent issues
14 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
15 Id. at 1005-06.

16 Id. Additionally, it could be demonstrated that the owner will be given fair
compensation for the taking of the intangible property right. Id.
17 The competitor did not have access to the testing data or the formula, but had
to pay an amount awarded in an EPA-supervised mandatory arbitration. See 7
U.S.C. § 136a(c)(l)(D) (1978).
18 Rucke/shaus, 467 U.S. at 1006.
19 Foreign trade secret licensing is a lucrative method of exporting technology.
See Pooley and Troesch, InternationalAspects of Trade Secret Protection, in PROTECTING
TRADE SECRETS 1989, 713 (1989).
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and becomes public information.2" Consequently, the availability
of chemical technology patents does not replace the need for
trade secrets.
Patents are not readily obtainable for certain mixtures and
processes; their pursuit, and later enforcement, requires large investments of time and money. 2 ' The Supreme Court recognized
the continued vitality of state law trade secrets in 1974 in Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. ,22 holding that the patent system did not
remove the legal validity of state trade secrecy laws. 23 According
24
to the classic definition provided in the Restatement of Torts,
exclusive possession rights of owners are protected, but only until separate and independent discovery by a competitor ends exclusivity or until some form of publication or public
dissemination occurs.25
III.

SECRECY AND ANALYSIS

There is a commonly accepted myth that analytical machinery has destroyed trade secrecy, so that all chemical products can
now be readily broken down into each of their component parts.
This claim is incorrect, however, because the skill of the
fabricator will always stay one step ahead of the imitator. 26 Methods of analysis for reaching the tiny fraction of a liquid or powder
that add the unique competitive benefit must be developed; they
are masked by the expert maker through one or more processing
steps.27
New Jersey's 1983 law requires that any trade secret consid20 Issuance of a patent terminates secrecy as to the identities disclosed in the
publication.
21 These transactional difficulties are well recognized. See, e.g., Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971, 982 (1989) ("the competitive
reality of reverse engineering may act as a spur to the inventor, creating an incentive to develop inventions which meet the rigorous requirements of
patentability.").
22 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
23 Id. at 474.
24 RESTATEMENr OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).

25 Id. The independent discovery by a competitor and/or public dissemination
of the secret terminates the exclusivity rights of the owner.
26 Multiple methods of "masking" minor ingredients can and do frustrate the
reverse-engineering efforts of the competitor who seeks to obtain the same scent,
flavor, shine or other aesthetic attribute of a consumer product, or the same performance feature of an industrial product.
27 It is often these methods of analysis that must be developed, at considerable
expense, before the breakdown of the mixture into subcomponents can be successfully attempted.

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:64

erations include "the ease or difficulty with which the information could be disclosed by analytical techniques, laboratory
procedures, or other means."2 8 The law deleted a clause that detection means be available to a competitor at a reasonable expense,29 focusing instead on "ease or difficulty." 3 Under the
statute, the state agency and the courts would receive affidavits
and testimony from experts, as the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) and EPA have done, demonstrating that reverse engineering-the reconstruction of a mixture after detection of every component-is a very difficult pursuit.3 '
Competitors who are able to replicate the chemistry of an
innovative product do so rapidly. In a recent federal appellate
case, an EPA decision that denied trade secret status to a cosmetic company was overturned. 32 The EPA asserted that competing firms could discover the chemical. The court found that
no evidence suggested that competing firms had in fact discovered and duplicated the chemical. 33 Accordingly, companies do
not lose trade secrecy even if competitors might have detected
the secret. The technological leaders in industry must be vigilant, but they need not concede the disclosability of a formula
unless the competition has in fact been able to duplicate it.
IV.

THE MAJOR CHANGE IN DISCLOSURE CONTENT

New Jersey has reached a critical juncture in its industrial

history. The cradle of technological development will become
less hospitable to trade secrets, with the implementation 34 of a
disclosure law that requires more disclosure than other states.35
The provisions of the 1983 law that went into effect in 1990 will
mandate disclosure of the contents of virtually every industrial
container found in the state. Specifically, every container found
28 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-3(u) (West 1988).

29 Id. The phrase had appeared in an earlier version of the proposed law. See S.
1670, 200th Leg., 2d Sess., 1983 NJ. Sess. Law Serv. 1694 (West 1984).
30 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-3(u) (West 1988).
31 These presentations to EPA and OSHA have demonstrated the cost of methods development, research and expertise, which are the primary disincentives to
reverse engineering of chemical mixtures.
32 Zotos Int'l, Inc. v. Young, 830 F.2d 350, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

33 Id. at 353.
34 The label rules became effective March 31, 1990. 21 N.J. Reg. 1268 (May 15,

1989).
35 New Jersey disclosure requirements for nonhazardous ingredients, and its prohibition of trade secret assertions in certain chemical categories, are more stringent
than those in other states.

1990]

TECHNOLOGY AND TRADE SECRECY

in every New Jersey industrial or institutional facility will be labeled with the recipe of the five largest nonhazardous ingredients, as well as any hazardous ingredients constituting at least
one percent of the mixture.3 6 If the chemical is (1) hazardous, (2)
found in a mixture, and (3) is present at the facility in quantities
greater than 500 pounds in aggregate, labeling of low levels of
that ingredient is also required.3 7 This includes many specialty
are deemed
mixture ingredients which can burn, and, therefore,
3
hazardous because of potential flammability. 1
While the average consumer or lawyer will rarely notice a
difference, the industrial sector in which new products are developed will blossom with labels, ingredient disclosures and new information. These newest blossoms of the Garden State differ
from the flora of other jurisdictions. It is, therefore, worthwhile
to step back and examine the background of this important disclosure mandate.
The Policy Balance

A.

The right of workers to understand risks to which they may
be exposed in the workplace is well accepted in the United States
and abroad.3 9 Risk avoidance training is commonplace in more
sophisticated and larger facilities; training for safety has gone on
for decades in chemical processing facilities. The acute risks of
injury in chemical manufacture are significantly lower than in
other occupational settings.4"
The debate over ingredient disclosure focuses on the balancing of economic and safety interests. Commercial development
of competing products through determination of competitors'
formulations and processes is a well recognized form of competition. After all, imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. When
36

N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 34:5A-14(b) (West 1988).

37 Id. See also N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8 § 59-5.1 (1990).
38 For example, many solvents are petroleum-based and would be classified as

"hazardous" for flammability reasons. Consequently, they are subject to the statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-3(n)(4), and therefore included on the state's list of
hazardous chemicals. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8 § 59 app. A, B, 21 N.J. Reg. 1196
(May 15, 1989).
39 For reasons of space, a longer discourse on this theme is not possible here,
but is available in J. O'REILLY, UNIONS' RIGHTS TO COMPANY INFORMATION (2d Ed.
1987) and O'Reilly, Driving a Soft Bargain: Unions, Toxic Materials, and Right to Know
Legislation, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 307, 317 (1985).
40 Statistics compiled on occupational injuries by Standard Industrial Classification show that chemical sector employee injury rates are well below those of other
occupations, such as publishing, electric utility service or food manufacture. U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1989, at 414 (1989).
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this determination of competitive product features occurs
through nonroutine channels, the activity lives in the shadows of
modern industry.4 ' Greater public disclosure requirements bring
these activities out of the shadows and into a routine service. Researchers may then analyze the competing firm's public filings of
chemical release forms4 2 and discern trends and developments
that expedite product changes by knowledgeable formulators
within other firms. The greater the disclosure, the more rapid
the competitive response to improvements in products. The result, in economic terms, is the reduction of the "product life cycle" within which the costs of innovation can be recouped.4"
The countervailing public interest in disclosure of safety related information, including chemical identities, focuses upon expanded knowledge as a basis for expanded self-protection.
Information, however, can also be a source of alarm. By analogy,
an industrial plant may appear helpful to the local economy, but
the appearance of published lists of toxic chemicals discharged
from the plant44 acts in much the same way as a Halloween mask,
putting a new and more frightening "face" on the industry's
presence in the community. The reality is somewhere between
the mask and the facade.
Industrial development is not cheap, and the assurance of
safety involves significant investments that are not always made
in a timely manner. The subcategories of chemical users are not
41 Industrial espionage is the nonroutine channel for discovery of the innovator's secret process or ingredient. Avoidance of loss through prevention of successful commercial espionage is a rationale for numerous and expensive safeguards
of commercial chemical information. "[O]ne who claims that he has a trade secret
must exercise eternal vigilance." J.T. Healy & Son, Inc. v.James A. Murphy & Son,
Inc., 357 Mass. 728, 738, 260 N.E.2d 723, 731 (1970). Reasonable steps to avoid
such losses are necessary to trade secret status. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 § IG6.9(c)(3) (1984). See alsoJ. POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS: A GUIDE TO PROTECTING PROPRIETARY BUSINESS INFORMATION 49-88 (1989); Pringle, Security Programsand the Protection of Trade Secrets, in PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS 1989 277 (1989); Phillips, The

Concept of Reasonableness in the Protection of Trade Secrets, 42 Bus. Law. 1045 (1987).
42 Forms describing chemicals used at a facility must be filed pursuant to both
NewJersey and federal requirements. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 § 1G-3.1 (1989);
42 U.S.C. § 11023 (1988).
43 The product life cycle concept is an economic model under which new products gradually replace older, less efficient products. The interruption of the evolutionary change comes when a competing firm finds the advantageous property of
the first chemical product and duplicates that product's advantage. The rise of
public disclosure laws has changed the dynamics of the product life cycle concept
and made the life, or period of economic return on investment, considerably
shorter. See W. CASEY, supra note 5, at 179.
44 These become public records because of EPA regulations under 42 U.S.C.
§ 11023 (1988). See also 40 C.F.R. § 372 (1989).

1990]

TECHNOLOGY AND TRADE SECRECY

all alike, in sophistication, environmental concern or willingness
to invest in safety measures. Consequently, the task of state and
local government is to act as surrogate for the residents, assuring
a reasonable degree of protection from the untoward side effects
of industrial expansion. Disclosure may assist the state and local
government in making safety decisions.4 5
B.

The Nexus of the Controversy

The disclosure of technological details about chemical facilities is a less complex legal issue than it may appear. The issue
may be stated: whether disclosure of previously confidential
chemical data to recipients who are not public officials, or who
are not members of the immediate employee work force of the
owner, entails a loss of the "reasonable investment-backed expectations" of confidentiality. Should the loss be mandated?
The policy issue is whether that loss is justified by the recipients' marginal net benefits from acquiring that knowledge in addition to the body of other related knowledge that is routinely
accessible. Further, the issue could be easily broadened, adding
a series of other policy overlays upon the basic point of disagreement. However, one cannot equate the legal complexity with the
factual complexity, which is a separate issue. Certainly, factual
determinations about elements of competitor knowledge, ease of
detection, value and the like are tough factual decisions that must
be resolved with a case by case determination. As a global policy
debate, the nexus of debate becomes quite narrow, once the baggage of political controversy is removed.
Of course, not all disclosure of a special ingredient is economically disadvantageous. Public officials retain the confidential data in secure facilities, or should do so. 46 The list of
chemicals used in a product can be disseminated to persons in
the public sector, or to those few persons who have contracts
preserving confidentiality in some business or employment relationship, without causing "public disclosure." 47 However, when
45 For example, a local fire department could verify or update its records concerning the storage of flammable liquids by examining the inventory record that is
required to be filed each October by facilities holding more than 10,000 pounds of
flammable liquids. See 42 U.S.C. § 11021 (1988).
46 N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 § IG-6.7(f) (1984).
47 The owner does not lose its confidentiality rights by such a limited and con-

trolled dissemination. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939); Jager
and Anderson, Trade Secret Licensing, in PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS 1989, 87
(1989).
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the lists, identities and container ingredients are made more
widely available, loss of exclusive possession occurs. 48 A suggested policy response might be:
(1) Is this loss of exclusive possession a valid policy decision
for government to make? The marginal protective benefit
for individuals is quite low. Health risk data is readily accessible,4 9 and government is better equipped to translate
specific technical data into safety assessments. Thus, the
marginal additional protection of disseminating specific
ecochemical data does not justify the corresponding
5 °
nomic displacement of market position.
(2) Should owners of secrets have reasonable expectations of
continued confidential status in New Jersey? Visions
about the state's economic future will dictate the response
to this question.
(3) Is disclosure likely to lessen the reward to entrepreneurs
for innovation in chemical products? Experience suggests
that the social policy answer should be "yes." Almost certainly the smaller firm stands to lose more from each
chemical formulation that it discloses, than does the larger
firm with multiple product lines. 5 '
(4) Is dissemination essential to public health? Public protection from the risks of soil, airborne, or groundwater transmission of disease, including chronic illness, can occur
through the responsible work of environmental control officials. They already act as regulatory "disclosure surrogates" for persons who otherwise have no means of
understanding the risk factors. Regulators as surrogates
would be able to study the suspect chemical releases
against the background of the full set of a trade secret
48 Id. See also 40 C.F.R. § 750 (1989) (EPA trade secret regulations under SARA
law). Interestingly, New Jersey expressly bars trade secret claims for several categories of chemicals, including all those on a special state list. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 7 § IG-6.5(a) (1984).
49 Health risk data on chemicals must be presented in worker safety training. 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1981). Further, it must be made available under the Toxic
SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 2613(b) (1988).
50 A comparison of worker protective measures involving the generic identity
against those with the specific identity will typically reveal that the same measures
are taken. Because the employer is required to train employees with regard to
safety measures and disclose risk data, the specific name within a generic category
rarely will add to the self-protective individual incentives felt by the workers. See
generally W. CASEY, supra note 5, at 179 (economic loss issues); Willis, An Economic
Evaluation of Trade Secrets, in PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS 1989, supra note 5, at 737.
51 This postulate is premised upon the assumption that one lost trade secret
among five will represent a 20% loss in the profitable licensing or product development activities of the small firm, while one loss among five hundred will have a
minor effect on the large firm's prospects for survival.
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owner's data, 52 and could penalize the violator if punishment is warranted.
(5) Can enforcement of the disclosure law occur without releasing the secret identities? Yes, the violator can be compelled to defend its actions in a public hearing, with
limited portions closed under protective order. 5 ' The
registrant or submitter can discuss the safety of generic
named categories of products without putting on the public record the particular substance within the category.5 4
Accordingly, dissemination of the key trade secret identities and processes is not a necessary element of public
protection.
The argument for a "no" response to the question of protecting trade secrets is more speculative. For example, the fact that a
release occurs from a plant into the air, consisting of thirty kilograms of an unnamed material within a particular class, is conceded
to be disclosed to the public.5 5 Air emission data is public under
federal law and its state counterparts.5 6 The specific identity is
claimed as secret because it may be one of 500 entities within that
class. The citizen has access to the generic identities and all the statistical data via a personal computer hookup to the EPA data base.5 7
52

The reader must remember that state and county officials in New Jersey will

know the specific identity of the confidential chemical. The issue presented is not
the socially beneficial use of confidential data by protective agencies, but rather the
wider dissemination to private persons or organizations as a result of statutory mandates to disclose data more broadly.
53 An Administrative Law Judge has the authority to close a hearing during the
presentation of testimony asserted to be privileged as trade secret data. These
cases will be fraught with other adjudication problems as well. See O'Reilly, The
Impact of Performance-Oriented Rules on Administrative Enforcement: The Case of OSHA

Hazard Communication Rules, 2 Labor Lawyer 695 (1986).
54 An extensive study of this problem of confidential chemical identities during
adjudications urged that identity confidentiality be subject to administrative protective orders. Toxic Chemicals and Public Protection, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE
Toxic SUBSTANCES STRATEGY CoMMrIrEE, 60 (May 1980).
55 See 40 C.F.R. § 372.85 (a) (1989) (EPA Toxic Chemical Release Reporting
Form R).

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (1988).
Persons with personal computers and modems may obtain the data directly
from the National Library of Medicine data base, or copies of the tapes may be
purchased from the National Technical Information Service. Computer access
charges may be waived by EPA in certain circumstances. See EPA Notice, Fee
Waiver, Community Right-to-Know Pilot Program, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,415 (June 7,
1989). The NewJersey Department of Health intends to place compact disk reader
56
57

machines in'each county for citizen use. See U.S. EPA, Accessing the Toxics Release

Inventory Data, 10 Office of Toxic Substances Chemicals In Progress Bulletin 3 (September 1989) and New Jersey RTK Program Continues Innovations, 3 Right to Know
News 7 (Oct. 22, 1988).
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Such a recipient of data is arguably better equipped to review his or
her government's protective measures by knowing which entity is
actually produced. By spreading the details of ingredient technology more broadly, it might be asserted, a citizen acting alone or with
others could independently verify that the government is acting with
sufficient vigor.5
C.

Is Public Sharing of Data Needed?

How much disclosure about specific chemicals is needed for
protection of the public from the hazards of exposure in the
event of possible releases? The role of federal OSHA and state
labor officials in protecting workers against unsafe workplace exposure to hazardous chemicals operates without regard to public
disclosures: public officials are not permitted to disseminate
trade secret information about chemicals or processes unless
they follow legislated guidelines for disclosure.5 9 Federal EPA
and state disaster service planners have access to actual data
under the post-Bhopal legislation known as "SARA Title III,"6
from which local emergency plans may be refined. 6
Sharing of data with government under nondisclosure conditions is generally accepted by industry, though a natural mistrust of government must be expected. In the case of federal
employees, an OSHA inspector would not disclose the solvents
used in one plant to the competing company whose plant is subsequently inspected.6 2 To do so might result in prosecution of
the employee under the Trade Secrets Act.6 3 Similarly, an EPA
employee who has access to data bases containing information
about chemicals for which trade secret claims have been filed is
specially guided by EPA policy. The employee must not allow
58 Under this theory, the existing supervision of EPA Region II's toxics enforcement by EPA management, the White House, the House and Senate oversight subcommittees, the General Accounting Office, and the state and public interest
groups, is not sufficient to assure vigor of the agency. The reader may properly
question the prudence of the advocates' expectation that individual users could
motivate an agency better than the checks and balances of modem administrative
structures have done. New Jersey Governor James Florio, a congressional sponsor
of SARA Title III, was an ardent critic of the EPA and may be expected to closely
examine federal environmental performance in New Jersey during his tenure.
59 42 U.S.C. § 11042 (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 664 (1988).
60 42 U.S.C. § 11013 (1988).
61 The actual disaster planning function necessitates this limited access for a
public purpose. This article does not address the planning aspects of the multifaceted SARA Title III legislation.
62 Such action would violate 29 U.S.C. § 664 (1988).
63 See 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1988).
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unauthorized EPA employees to have access to the confidential
business information, which is maintained in specially-secured
"CBI" files.6 4 Comparable state sanctions could likewise be imposed against an employee who disseminated confidential documents from state files to unauthorized recipients.
D.

The HistoricalSettingfor "Right to Know"

The degree of dissemination that a trade secret owner must
make has occupied a significant portion of the decades-long debate over "worker right to know" legislation. A look back into
the evolution of this legislation will show how the current adversaries came to their different viewpoints.
Disclosure of chemical related information to workers has
been considered for years. Significantly, the mid-1970's was the
first time period in which organized labor made protection from
chronic exposure risks a high priority. The 1977 efforts by the
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union to obtain specific ingredient lists for chemicals used at each plant that employed
union members was a historic event.6 5 Like the seedling that
starts a forest, the persistence of this union in forcing ingredient
disclosure through labor bargaining systems had a major impact
on large unionized facilities. National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) rulings in favor of the union allowed employers to assert
some trade secret protection. However, the unions had won the
access they sought, and the courts upheld the power of the NLRB
to order the disclosure.6 6 Negotiations in the auto industry also
led to some disclosure requirements, but legislated rather than
negotiated systems predominate today.6 7
Legislation like New Jersey's was a conscious, strategic
choice made by the organized labor movement. It recognized
that the cost of information transfer is not slight, and the nature
of labor negotiations emphasizes that direct pay benefits are a
higher priority than information transfer benefits. The organized
64 40 C.F.R. § 2.203 (1989). See also N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 § IG-6.15 (1984)
(New Jersey parallel).
65 This saga is discussed in J. O'REILLY, UNIONS' RIGHT TO COMPANY INFORMATION 234 (rev. ed. 1987).
66 See, e.g., Colgate-Palmolive Co., 261 NLRB 90 (1982); Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 261 NLRB 27 (1982); Borden Chemical, 261 NLRB 64 (1982). These
were upheld on review, sub nom. Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers Local Union No.
6-418, AFL-CIO v. National Labor Relations Board, 711 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
67 Ford Motor Company was the first to agree to such a program in bargaining
with the United Auto Workers. SeeJ. O'REILLY, supra note 39, at 313 (discussion of
limited bargaining experience).
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labor movement also recognized that the cost of training and disclosures would adversely affect employers with union plants in
comparison to their nonunion competitors. Not surprisingly,
legislative efforts in California and New York secured the earliest
"worker right to know" laws.6" Trade secret provisions existed
in these enactments, but opportunities were assured for broader
disclosure to workers.
Federal rules imposing mandatory dissemination of chemical
ingredient and safety data to all workers would produce the maximum benefit for organized labor's goal, at a minimum of disadvantage for union facilities. During the Carter Administration,
efforts toward a federal regulation providing workers with the
disclosure of chemical ingredients were complicated by uncertainty and opposition at several levels.6 9 This effort -took the
form of a "hazard communication" standard developed under
the authority of OSHA.7 ° A debate had raged over trade secret
disclosure provisions. Simultaneously, a sister federal agency,
the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), was finding a significant need for more information about
complex mixtures. 7 After years of debate, a "midnight" regulation was hastily published on the last day before the Reagan Inauguration.7 2 This parting shot from the Carter Administration
would have imposed a very thorough regulation, mandating the
transfer of chemical information in the workplace. The proposal
was rapidly withdrawn by the incoming Administration. 73 Until
the final federal system became effective in 1985, the interregnum allowed states to experiment-and New Jersey's was a most
interesting venture.
E. The 1983 New Jersey Legislation
By 1983, when the New Jersey legislature passed the com74
prehensive community and worker "right to know" legislation,
emotions on the politically sensitive issue had become polarized.
68 CAL. LAB. CODE § 6399 (West 1989); N.Y. LABOR LAw § 877 (McKinney 1970
& Supp. 1990). For a proponent view, see Feitshans, HazardousSubstances in the Workplace: How Much Does the Employee have the "Right to Know, " 3 DET. L. REV. 697
(1985).
69 Id. See J. O'REILLY, supra note 65, at 224.
70 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1989).
71 SeeJ. O'RELLY supra note 65, at 223, 227.
72 See OSHA proposed rules, 46 Fed. Reg. 4,412 (Jan. 16, 1981).
73 See 46 Fed. Reg. 12,214 (Feb. 12, 1981) (withdrawal of proposal).
74 Worker and Community Right to Know Act, 1983 N.J. Laws 315, codified at
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:5A-1 to -31 (West 1988).
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If a federal standard had been in place, the state might not have
elected to go further. But, as occurred with a variety of state incentives during the deregulatory years of the Reagan Administration, the state legislature chose not to wait. New Jersey simply
acted for its own people and passed the most stringent disclosure
law ever adopted. By doing so, it challenged its own trade secret
owners, and the federal government, to adopt a radically pro-disclosure view of technological secrets.
After the withdrawal of the Carter Administration's OSHA
proposal, organized labor's activities to adopt the "right to
know" principles in individual states intensified. The NewJersey
legislature was a primary battleground for debate. Senator Dalton's bill drew considerable public attention.75 After numerous
debates, the "right to know" law was adopted in 1983.76 New
Jersey demonstrated how states could operate as laboratories, in
which the disclosure provisions of the failed federal proposals
continued to bubble up onto the agenda.
A major element of the federal proposals had been training,
to help workers understand the safety measures in their work areas and the chemical suppliers' materials safety data sheets
(MSDS) which contain precautions and preventive information. 77
Proponents of the New Jersey law disliked the prospect of relying
on manufacturers to prepare such sheets. Rather, New Jersey's
lawmakers chose to have the state assume the technically difficult
chore of writing statewide data sheets for specific chemicals. As a
result, a series of state fact sheets were created for distribution by
employers, replacing the MSDS available in industry.78
Most significantly, New Jersey drafters decided that the
quantity of disclosure required on container labels would be expanded beyond any previous requirements. The five most predominant non-hazardous chemicals found in a container had to be
identified on the container. 79 They would be identified in addition'to the names of those chemicals that are deemed "hazardous" by virtue of their appearing on the state's numerous lists of
75 S. 1670, 200th Leg., 2d Sess., 1983 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 1694 (West 1983)
adopted as chapter 315, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:5A-1, -31 (West 1988).
76 Id.
77 Training is a principal focus of the federal Hazard Communication Standard.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1989).
78 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-8 (West 1988); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8 § 59-4.1
(1990).
79 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-14(b) (West 1988).
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hazardous chemicals. 80 Thus, if a New Jersey factory received a
load of perfume that was flammable, the New Jersey container
label would list the components of the perfume that are hazardous and also those that are both (1) nonhazardous and (2) among
the top five ingredients by weight. Consequently, lists of ingredients would identify at least five, and often many more items, depending on the mixture.
The consequence was dramatic for specialty chemical firms
whose secret mixtures routinely carried only a code number and
a safety warning message. Now, when a container of perfume
with twelve listed components would be transported from vendor
to customer in New Jersey, it would arrive with the equivalent of
a recipe on its label. Not unexpectedly, those who manufacture
perfumes are jealous guardians of their special brew. Similarly,
lubricant, dye and pigment, flavor and fragrance makers depend
on the complexity of their special mixtures to assure saleability.
New Jersey's requirements for presenting names and Chemical
Abstract Service identifying numbers for each listed ingredient
removes the mystery, if any remains.
New Jersey went further, however, requiring that the several
state departments survey all factories and workplaces for environmental releases and exposures, as well as workplace exposures. 8 ' This means that a paint mixing plant, for example, would
disclose in its survey form that it has many named raw materials
and compounds on hand, with some lists compiled for the protection of the public from environmental harm, and others identified for worker safety. Similarly, manufacturers of a line of inks
would now disclose many of the ingredients that go into the arcane art of color matching and speedier drying. One who develops a better ink outside of New Jersey cannot sell the container in
the state without complying with the label requirements.8 2
The state law contains a trade secret provision,83 not yet
tested as this article goes to press. At the time it was adopted,
decisions about trade secret status were typically made in the
context of challenges, and not as a routine matter. Under the
state law provision, manufacturers who wish to save trade secret
identities of their chemicals must submit sealed envelopes to the
Id. See also N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8 § 59-5.1 (1990).
81 NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 § 1G-3.1 (1989).
80

82 Labels must be present when the product appears in the workplace, though
labels may be affixed by the vendor at its discretion.
83 N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 § 1G-6.2 (1984).
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state with the confidential identities of the trade secret chemicals. 4 The state would then decide what qualified as a trade secret. Exclusions from the availability of trade secrets in certain
categories make this section a controversial provision. 5
When the state receives the owner's trade secret claims, the
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) staff will make
its determination as to whether to grant confidential status. The
staff will consider the following: extent of knowledge of that
chemical outside of the owner's business; extent of internal
knowledge among employees; extent of measures taken to safeguard secrecy; value of the information to the owner or its competitor; the amount of effort that went into its development; and
the ease or difficulty of analytical discovery of the chemical.8 6
It has been estimated that before the New Jersey labeling
process is fully operational, thousands of trade secret claims will
have been filed.8 7 Decisions will need to be processed on many
of the claims in a relatively short period of time. Superior court
review of denials of trade secret status will likely involve a significant volume of litigation. The standard of confidentiality applied
by the courts is likely to be that of the Restatement of Torts88 and
of civil statutes protecting commercial secrets.8 9 Because the
statutory factors 9° are not very distinct from the Restatement criteria, courts will likely depend more on the common 9law trade
secret decisions than on regulatory law considerations. '
F. The FederalStandard is Adopted
Federal Hazard Communication Standard (HazCom) provisions were issued as final rules in November 1983, and refined
further in 1987.92 The federal HazCom system is oriented toward
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 § IG-6.4 (1984).
Excluded from confidential treatment are items on a special health hazard list,
and items for which a federal emission or effluent disclosure is reported, as well as
waste related data. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 § IG-6.5 (1984).
86 N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 § IG-6.6(c) (1984).
87 Claims are filed with the central office of the Department of Health in Trenton, which then decides whether to check the validity of the claim in a self-initiated
adjudication.
88 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
89 New Jersey protects owners of trade secrets against worker or other persons'
misappropriation of those valuable property rights. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-1(i), 7, -9 (West 1982).
90 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-3(u) (West 1988).
91 See, e.g., Sun Dial Corp. v. Rideout, 16 N.J. 252, 108 A.2d 442 (1954) (upholding trade secret status).
92 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1989).
84

85
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training .and, data sheet dissemination. Label warnings are
judged by their "performance;" many alternate methods may be
employed to induce the container user to pay heed to cautionary
information.93 Data sheets carry essential information, but no
single uniform data sheet is required.94
New Jersey, by contrast, does not utilize private data sheets,
instead relying upon a state-written fact sheet system. The state
has incorporated some training in its requirements, but the emphasis in New Jersey is on greater attention to design standards
95
for container labels.

The federal HazCom trade secrecy issues were extensively
discussed in the preamble to the final rule, having drawn extensive public comment for and against trade secrets. 96 The option
of advance screening of trade secrets, which New Jersey has
adopted Was not adopted under the Federal system. 97 Instead,
each owner of a putative trade secret makes its own decision and
challenges to that decision can be brought to OSHA by an employee.9" OSHA mediates the challenge and, in the event of a
trade secret dispute, issues a citation. 99 An independent adjudication of the dispute is then made by an Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) acting under procedures designed 'to protect the
trade secret from disclosure unless and until a decision is made
to deny trade secret status.' 0 0 The ALJ's decision is appealable
to a three-member federal commission and to the federal courts
of appeals.' O' Between 1985, when HazCom began to operate,
and November 1989, only twelve instances led to citations being
issued.' 0 2 When these dozen citations are compared to some
93 OSHA intended to avoid specifying certain methods of hazard communication so that existing voluntary communication programs could continue to be used
without substantial modification. Thus, the rule is a performance oriented rule that
leaves methods of compliance to the individual employer. See 48 Fed. Reg. 53282
(Nov. 25, 1983).
94 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1 2 00(g)(2) (1989).
95 See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-14 (West 1988).

96 48 Fed. Reg. 53,312-320 (Nov. 23, 1983); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(i) (1989).
97 48 Fed. Reg. 53,315 (Nov. 23, 1983).
98 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(i) (1989).

See also J. O'REILLY, PROTECTING WORK-

PLACE SECRETS: MANAGER'S GUIDE TO CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW

§ 8.07 (1985).
99 48 Fed. Reg. 53,315 (Nov. 23, 1983).
100 29 C.F.R'. § 2200.11 (1989); 51 Fed. Reg. 32,002 (Sept. 8, 1986). See O'Reilly,
supra note 53.
101 29 C.F.R. § 2200.91 (1989); 29 U.S.C. § 660 (1988). Commission review is
performed by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. 29 C.F.R.
§ 2200.91 (1989).
102 Address byJ. Silk, OSHA, To Flavor & Extract Mfrs. Assn. (Nov. 3, 1989).
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65,000 other citations under the federal standard, it is safe to
issue in the opconclude that trade secrecy has been a minuscule
03
eration of the federal HazCom standard.1
Virtually all states accepted the federal HazCom standard for
their own OSHA related programs.' 0 4 New Jersey-and the
analogous Pennsylvania program, enacted later, 0 5 -chose the
separate path of state-determined,' ingredient labeling requirements.
In addition to worker access to chemical data under the
HazCom standard, the 1986 Superfund Amendments &
Reauthorization Act contained provisions known as "SARA Title
III. 1 06 This Title compels state and local authorities to submit
inventories of hazardous chemicals.' °7 Virtually all New Jersey
listed chemicals will be subject to this inventory if present in sufficient quantities at a covered facility.' 08 Separate provisions require the submission of detailed chemical release forms from
manufacturing or processing sites to state and federal environmental agencies.' ° 9 This data is computerized and can be accessed from a personal computer for a nominal service fee." l0
SARA trade secret status is a complex subject best addressed
elsewhere, but its context is important."' New Jersey's labeling
disclosure and survey programs go beyond what federal SARA
requires. Also, a savings clause in the 1986 Act preserves many
of the 1983 New Jersey requirements."l 2 Thus, the computeraided resident of New Jersey has a great deal of chemical data
already on line, before the community aspects of the state law are
even considered.
103

Id.

If a state wished to retain its own program it would have to adopt a provision
at least as effective as the HazCom standard, and obtain OSHA approval of the
104

state plan. 29 U.S.C. § 667(c) (1988).
105 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7301.6 (Purdon 1984 & Supp. 1990).

42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 11022 (1988).
108 New Jersey's list of chemicals, 21 N.J. Reg. 1196-1251 (May 15, 1989), are
virtually all "hazardous" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 11021(e) (1988). If
present in quantities of 10,000 pounds or more, at a facility that is not exempt, they
must be reported to local officials, to state officials and to a local emergency response committee which must make the inventory public. 42 U.S.C. § 11022(a)
(1988).
109 These release reports are required under 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (1988).
110 See 54 Fed. Reg. 24,415 (June 7, 1989).
I I I See generally J. O'REILLY, PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS UNDER SARA TITLE III
(1988).
112 42 U.S.C. § 11041(b) (1988).
106
107
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G. Courts Limit New Jersey Powers
A series of industry challenges to the New Jersey law
culminated in a most unusual decision by the United States Court
of Appeals for-the Third Circuit in New Jersey Chamber of Commerce
v. Hughey (Hughey II).' 13 Federal occupational safety statutes expressly preempt a state from enforcing a workplace standard,
14
once the appropriate federal OSHA standard is in place."
Thus, industry sought a declaratory judgment from the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey invalidating
the New Jersey law." 5 On appeal, the Third Circuit held that a
state whose law had a dual purpose affecting two groups-workers and others-could maintain its law's non-occupational provisions even though 6occupational workplace disclosure provisions
were preempted." 1

The Hughey II Court reviewed each segment of the New
Jersey law. Under this rather strained partitioning, the court
found that a feature of the right to know law could be upheld if it
contained more of a community disclosure (non-occupational)
requirement than a worker disclosure (occupational) requirement.

17

Therefore, the controversial label disclosure provision

of New Jersey's community and worker right to know law was upheld by parsing each subsection of the law, and finding that nonhazardous ingredient container labels could be of some
assistance to the "community" beyond the workplace." 8 This
could include, for example, firefighters entering a burning warehouse-though anyone who has had emergency service exper"13 868 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3246 (1989). The third
circuit's original upholding of the New Jersey statute is found in New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985) (Hughey 1). Hughey I dealt
with express federal preemption; Hughey I dealt with implied preemption. The
Hughey I opinion did not address state-federal conflicts involving the labeling of
specific ingredients on containers. The same panel's earlier decision on the Pennsylvania statute is seen in Manufacturers Ass'n of Tri-County v. Knepper, 801 F.2d
130 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 66 (1987) [hereinafter Knepper].
114 See 29 U.S.C. § 667(b) (1988).
115 New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 600 F. Supp. 608, 609 (D.NJ.
1985), aff'd in part, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985).
116 Hughey 11, 868 F.2d at 626.
"17 Id. at 627. See also Knepper, 801 F.2d at 135.
118 See Hughey II, 868 F.2d at 621. In an unreported opinion on remand that was
affirmed in Hughey II, Judge Debevoise held that: (1) New Jersey's law served both
workers and firefighters; (2) labeling of all ingredients on containers would assist
emergency responders and; (3) the existence of a nonpreempted group of users
such as firefighters would justify the continued enforcement of the state law
notwithstanding the federal preemption of the exclusively workplace portions of
the New Jersey law. See id. at 629.
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iences doubts that ingredient labels within a burning warehouse
will ever be examined during the fire. OSHA-required signage
and labels, and local fire code requirements for placards within
storage areas, are much more likely to draw the attention of
emergency responders." 19
The portions of state chemical disclosure law that the Third
Circuit left in effect in New Jersey, therefore, include the
container label statements of nonhazardous chemicals, and the
trade secret registration provisions. 120 The Hughey II Court's invalidation of the workplace labels for workers is a sham, for the
identical workplace label requirements remain in place. Further,
workers coincidentally get the label as an unofficial supplement
to the benefits all workers receive from the federal training, labeling and data sheet programs. 12 1 The odds that the community

will be served by the label disclosures appear to be low. The
irony is that the workers served by the federal system get
whatever benefit the label provides, though they receive it under
the rubric of a non-preempted "community" disclosure.
V.

How

TRADE SECRET CONFLICTS WILL BE RESOLVED

The New Jersey container labels are now visible throughout
the state. 122 Simultaneously, residents with personal computers
will be able to tap into a state data base on chemicals, as well as
119 Placards and building signs, required under fire codes, insurance requirements and OSHA standards, are likely to provide the primary on-scene data from
which an emergency responder is trained to make a decision. The label type sizes
for ingredient disclosure are small: they could not be examined from a safe distance during most emergency and fire situations. One who responds to a hazardous materials emergency should remain away from potentially affected containers
at a safe distance while placards and site plans are checked. A safety principle of
staying away and upwind of containers is taught to all emergency responders. See
A. SMrrH, MANAGING HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES ACCIDENTS 69 (1981); U.S. Dept. of
Transportation, Guidebook for HazardousMaterials Incidents, 1, 2 (1984).
120 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-14, - 15 (West 1988).
121 Hughey II, 868 F.2d at 627-28. It is an ironic paradox to observe that: (1)
OSHA specifically decided not to require the ingredient labeling, but to allow code
numbers and common names on containers, see 48 Fed. Reg. 53,301, 53,303 (Nov.
25, 1983); (2) OSHA has preemptive effects over the workplace portions of the New
Jersey statute, see Hughey I, 744 F.2d 587; Hughey 11, 868 F.2d 621; (3) the labeling
of ingredients must be placed on containers for the benefit of the emergency responders; but (4) these recipients of the information are trained to stay away from
such containers during emergencies and get the data from other sources. See
SMrrH, supra note 119, at 72.
122 The label requirements were adopted effective March 31, 1990. 21 N.J. Reg.
1,268 (May 15, 1989); N.J. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 8 § 59-11.6(b) (1990). Nonlabeling
results in a $2,500 civil penalty and $1,000 per day additional penalties after service
of a corrective order. N.J. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 8 § 59-8.2 (1990).
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to a federal "toxic chemicals release" data base managed by the
National Library of Medicine for the EPA. 2 ' Those residents
who are sophisticated enough to interpret chemical inventory
lists can also obtain copies of the state's Environmental Survey, a
wide ranging inventory of chemicals,' 24 and copies of the inventory of larger quantities of chemicals reported by the firm to state
officials under "SARA Title III."125
If a person desires access to the specific chemical identity of
a company's product that had been withheld from containers and
survey forms as a trade secret, then an application for access can
be sent to the New Jersey DEP. 126 The DEP has the option to
decide "up front," at the time of the owner's submission,
whether to reject trade secrecy, or it may wait for an access request. An initial DEP decision to disclose is communicated in
writing to the owner. Within forty-five days of such a notice, the
owner can request an administrative hearing. At such a hearing,
the owner carries the burden of proof before a state ALJ that the
identity is a trade secret. 127 The ALJ's recommendation goes
back to DEP, which decides within
forty-five days to accept or
12
reject the trade secrecy appeal.

If the appeal is denied, the owner has two options: to label
the actual identities, replacing existing container labels that included a number instead of a name, or to request that the superior court overturn the DEP denial. The DEP's denial is
1 29
considered the final agency action for purposes of review.
Once disclosure occurs, it is permanent by its very nature; there
is no patchwork remediation after public release of a trade
secret!-'o
123 54 Fed. Reg. 24,415 (June 7, 1989).

124 These are publicly available at the county health department and must be
reproduced on request for the cost of copies. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:5A-22 (West
1988). Contents of this list are described in N.J. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 8 § 59-9.2
(1990).
125 These must be available from the local emergency planning committee and
the local fire department on request. 42 U.S.C. § 11044 (1988).
126 N.J. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 8 § 59-3.10 (1986).
127 N.J. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 8 § 59-3.13 (1986).
128 Id.
129 Id.

130 Once a trade secret is disclosed, it is not retrievable or remediable. Thus,
courts pay special attention to disclosure questions regarding trade secrets. See
General Motors Corp. v. Marshall, 654 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1981) (1981).

1990]

TECHNOLOGY AND TRADE SECRECY
VI.

CONCLUSION

New Jersey decided to bring chemical disclosures to the
community in its 1983 legislation. The segment of the community that is concerned about chemicals has been warmed up for
this arrival by the OSHA disclosure rules and the 1986 SARA
Title III data. But the extent and specificity of label disclosures is
remarkably broad. A consequence of the broad disclosure may
well be to dissuade industry from location, or expansion, in New
Jersey.
Implementation of container labeling provisions will deepen
the dimensions of industry's trade secret problem. The result will
be more distrust between industry and state officials, as those officials strive to decide the many trade secret claims. Outcomes of
the many trade secret decisions anticipated to occur during 199091 will be closely watched. If the New Jersey courts follow the
historically accepted Restatement test, there will be less likelihood of conflicts.
Technology of information access, often studied in journals,
is about to collide with traditions of nonaccess to information
about the chemical technology businesses in New Jersey. Considering the size of research and development employment and
investment, the New Jersey collision will be historic. Will trade
secrets for these items of technology survive the collision? That
may be the last real secret, for only time can tell.

